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Abstract
We study the impact of financial education on intertemporal choice in adoles-
cence. The educational program was randomly assigned among high-school stu-
dents and choices were measured using an incentivized experiment. Students who
participated in the program make more time-consistent choices; are more likely
to allocate payments to a single payment date, as opposed to spreading payment
across two dates; and display increased consistency of choice with the law of de-
mand. These findings suggest that financial education increases the quality of
intertemporal decision-making and decreases narrow bracketing.
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1 Introduction
Many important financial decisions are intertemporal: saving for retirement, credit card
debt, and mortgage choice, among others. As financial products have become more
complex and the responsibility for retirement provision is increasingly being shifted
towards individual households around the world, concerns about poor intertemporal
decision-making intensify. A large body of evidence shows that many individuals save
too little for retirement (e.g., Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007, 2008), while others accumulate
high amounts of credit card debt (e.g., Meier and Sprenger, 2010). Such behaviors
have been associated with a lack of financial knowledge (e.g., Hastings, Madrian and
Skimmyhorn, 2013; Lusardi and Mitchell, 2014; Lusardi and Tufano, 2015). More
broadly, low wealth accumulation and wealth inequality have been attributed to poor
financial knowledge among certain segments of the population (e.g., Lusardi, Michaud
and Mitchell, 2016).
A central policy implication arising from these findings is that improvements in
financial education may yield significant welfare increases. Indeed, this motivation has
spurred a substantial increase in the provision of financial education programs in recent
years.1 Yet, the causal effect of financial education on financial decision-making is
poorly understood.
Financial education may improve the quality of decision-making by increasing indi-
viduals’ knowledge about the availability of saving and borrowing instruments. From
this perspective, financial education programs might affect intertemporal choice by in-
creasing sophistication in making these choices, and thus help individuals implement
their preferences. At the same time, financial education may affect deep time prefer-
ences. Becker and Mulligan (1997) suggest that educational programs that emphasize
the future, such as financial education, may increase an individual’s preference for the
1For example, in 2013, an estimated $670 million was spent on such programs (CFPB, 2013).
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future. Especially at a young age, elevating an individual’s focus on financial planning
and achieving future savings goals could decrease impatience and present bias.
In this paper, we examine the effect of financial education on intertemporal choice
among adolescents. Targeting financial education programs at adolescents and de-
livering them in schools holds particular appeal for two reasons: it allows universal
population outreach and it is timely, as experimental studies of time, risk and social
preferences show that preferences gradually stabilize at the end of adolescence.
We conduct a field experiment among over 900 students in 25 high schools, in
which participation in a financial education program is randomly assigned. We then
elicit incentivized intertemporal choices, using the Convex Time Budget (CTB) task
(Andreoni and Sprenger, 2012). The CTB allows researchers to assess whether and by
how much subjects smooth time-dated monetary rewards,2 and whether their choices
are consistent with the law of demand, a measure of the quality of decision-making
(Gine´ et al., 2016).
We identify two main changes in intertemporal choice due to financial education.
First, the treatment decreases time inconsistency in students’ experimental choices.
Treated students are less likely to allocate a larger share of the budget to the sooner
payment date when it is immediate, a measure of present bias within the task. Second,
the treatment leads to an increase of almost 20% in the frequency with which the entire
budget is allocated to a single payment date. In addition, we observe an increase in
the share of students who choose to allocate the entire budget to the earlier payment
date at low interest rates, and then switch to allocating the entire budget to the later
2The CTB task allows individuals to spread the payments offered by the experimenter across two
payment dates, or to allocate the entire payment either to the sooner or to the later payment date.
Previous experimental tasks using choice lists only allow corner choices, i.e., individuals allocate the
entire budget either to the sooner or to the later payment date. Early studies among adults include
Coller and Williams (1999) and Harrison, Lau and Williams (2002), while the first study among
children was conducted by Bettinger and Slonim (2007). To allow for concave utility when estimating
time preference parameters, several studies have elicited risk preferences separately (e.g., Andersen et
al., 2008, Sutter et al., 2013).
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payment date at higher interest rates.
The treatment leads to changes in two other dimensions of choice, which are related
to the understanding of intertemporal choices. We observe a significant increase in
the rate of consistency with the law of demand: Treated students are more likely to
decrease the allocation to the earlier payment date as the interest rate increases, an
indication of increased quality of decision-making (Gine´ et al., 2016). And, treated
students are significantly less likely to exhibit negative discounting. This leads to an
apparent increase in impatience (or delay sensitivity) among treated students. This
increase can be explained by the fact that treated students are more likely to behave
as assumed in standard models of intertemporal choice, where discount rates are zero
or positive (see also Chakraborty et al., 2015).
The decrease in time inconsistency is robust to accounting for choice inconsistencies,
suggesting that changes in understanding do not directly explain the effect of financial
education on time consistency. At the same time, the observed decrease in time in-
consistency paired with the increase in allocations of the budget to a single payment
date is consistent with an increase in students’ consideration of alternative sources
of consumption when making intertemporal choices. That is, our findings suggest that
treated students are less likely to treat experimental payments as consumption, ignoring
rescheduling opportunities available through savings or borrowing vehicles (e.g., Freder-
ick, Loewenstein and O’Donoghue, 2002; Harrison, Lau and Williams, 2002, Cubitt and
Read, 2007; Chabris, Laibson and Schuldt, 2008; Sprenger, 2015). When individuals
are more “financially sophisticated”, and integrate experimental payments with other
sources of consumption, they are more likely to make time consistent choices and less
likely to smooth intertemporal payments within the task, two behaviors that treated
students display.3
3Further, we examine the correlation between external savings behavior and experimental choices
among adolescents. In several studies such a correlation has been considered an indication of the
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Taken together, our findings suggest that financial education changes intertemporal
decision-making by increasing sophistication and understanding of intertemporal choice.
This is a dimension of financial education which has received little attention so far
(Ambuehl, Bernheim and Lusardi, 2016). Existing evaluations have mainly focused
on changes in behaviors such as savings, and often find no effects among adults (see
Hastings, Madrian and Skimmyhorn, 2013, and Fernandes, Lynch and Netemeyer, 2014,
for reviews),4 while results are mixed for adolescents and young adults.5 Consistent with
these findings, survey measures of savings in our data do not indicate a change in savings
behavior in response to the program.
Our conclusion is that financial education influences adolescents’ intertemporal choices
by making them more consistent with standard assumptions of discounted utility mod-
els (Samuelson, 1937).6 These positive effects of financial education on the quality of
intertemporal decision-making could have important long-run consequences for an indi-
vidual‘s financial situation. For example, there is evidence that better decision-making
is associated with higher levels of wealth accumulation (Choi et al., 2014).
Our findings also contribute to the debate on the identification of individual time
preferences in experiments using time-dated monetary payments. Students in the con-
trol group display significant time inconsistency. The estimated present-bias parameter
validity of experimental tasks in identifying individual time preferences (e.g., Castillo et al., 2011;
Sutter et al., 2013). This relationship is weakened among treated students, suggesting that the program
makes experimental choices less informative about time preference parameters.
4Recent studies suggest that the characteristics of the program may be crucially important. Com-
bining education with grants improves the outcomes of male entrepreneurs (Berge, Bjorvatn and Tun-
godden, 2015), as does teaching simple financial heuristics (Drexler, Fischer and Schoar, 2014) or using
different visual tools (Lusardi et al., 2017).
5An increasing number of programs and researchers focus on financial education among youth, for
which there are potentially large long-term effects and which take place before individuals have made
important irreversible financial decisions (Lusardi, Mitchell and Curto, 2010). The evidence on the
impact of such programs, however, is mixed (Bernheim, Garrett and Maki, 2001; Bruhn et al., 2013;
Becchetti, Caizza and Covello, 2013; Cole, Paulson and Shastry, 2014; Berry, Karlan and Pradhan,
2015; Lu¨hrmann, Serra-Garcia and Winter, 2015).
6For an approach based on testing the understanding of opportunity sets, see Ambuehl, Bernheim
and Lusardi (2016).
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for this group is close to that found when intertemporal choices are elicited in the effort
domain (Augenblick, Niederle and Sprenger, 2015). This suggests that using monetary
rewards to elicit time preferences can be a valid approach under specific conditions.
To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to identify an important factor,
financial education, that may limit the task’s validity.7
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we describe
the financial education program. In Section 3 we describe the experimental task, the
methods used and the conceptual framework. In Section 4 we present the effects of
the program on intertemporal choices. In Section 5 we present additional analyses
that investigate the potential mechanisms underlying the treatment effects. Section 6
concludes.
2 The Financial Education Program
The financial education program we study is offered by a German non-profit organi-
zation, My Finance Coach (2012). Since its start-up in October 2010, it has offered
financial education to over 35,000 high school students, ages 13 to 15. The program
sends“finance coaches” to schools, who are employees of the (for-profit) firms that spon-
sor the (non-profit) provider; they are not compensated for the training provided. They
conduct several visits of 90 minutes for a total of 4.5 hours dedicated to several training
modules. The provider offers a set of materials for each module and trains the coaches,
so the educational program is standardized.
7A study that is closely related to ours is that by Coller and Williams (1999) who provide subjects
with information about market interest rates, and find relatively small changes in elicited intertemporal
choices. Recent studies that introduce willpower manipulations (Kuhn, Kuhn and Villeval, 2013) and
savings accounts (Carvalho, Prina and Sydnor, 2016) find an increase in the frequency with which
individuals choose to allocate their budgets to a single payment date. One interpretation of such
results could be that such interventions also affect the extent to which experimental payments are
treated as consumption and therefore the ability to identify time preference parameters.
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This program is well suited for studying the impact of financial education among
adolescents for several reasons. Since it is provided at schools, all students in a class
participate, avoiding selection problems (see, e.g., Meier and Sprenger, 2013). Moreover,
the materials are standardized, have been developed by educational experts (ranging
from education researchers to school directors), and they have been extensively used
for several years in Germany. Finally, this educational intervention is scalable: A large
number of students can be reached using the same format of the educational program
across different schools in potentially different countries.
We measure the joint impact of three training modules provided to all treated stu-
dents: Shopping, Planning, and Saving. These are the three main modules offered by
the provider, who also offers other extension modules focused on topics such as the
environment and business. As described in the materials supplied by the provider (see
Table A.1 in the Appendix for details), the Shopping module focuses on the informed
consumer. It emphasizes prioritizing spending (“needs and wants”), discusses criteria
used in purchasing decisions, and advertising. The Planning module addresses aspects
of conscious planning, by presenting the concepts of income and expenditure as the
basis of financial planning. It also trains students on budgeting skills. The last mod-
ule, Saving, discusses saving motives and investment options. The training does not
take a normative position on saving, but rather discusses how to save. Importantly,
the training involves no decision directly resembling the tradeoffs in the intertemporal
choice task we study, which we describe in what follows.
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3 Experimental Design and Conceptual Framework
3.1 Setting and Randomization
The schools in our study pertain to the two lower tracks of the German high school
system. Students in these two tracks typically continue with vocational training after
graduation (rather than attending college). These types of students constitute 48% of
the high-school population (Autorengruppe Bildungsberichterstattung, 2016).8 They
have on average lower socio-economic status than students pursuing the track to attend
college (Dustmann, 2004).
Randomization of classes to control and treatment groups was implemented through
a web interface designed by the research team. Schools in the treatment group received
the training earlier in the school year, while schools in the control group received the
program towards the end of the school year.9
The CTB task was conducted by the research team independently from the educa-
tional program and the coaches that had taught the materials to the students. The task
was ran before the schools in the control group participated in the program, and it was
scheduled such that all treatment and control schools would complete the task within
the same week. Randomization occurred at the school level to avoid spillover effects.
Randomization was stratified by city, across the cities of Berlin, Du¨sseldorf, and Mu-
nich in Germany, such that differences in educational systems in the different areas are
orthogonal to the treatment allocation. Since we were bound by scheduling constraints
stemming from the requirement that all participating schools receive the training by
8The school system in Germany has three types of high schools, starting as of age 10. These
tracks comprise of schools where students pursue vocational training (Hauptschule, Sekundarschule,
Mittelschule), combine both vocational training with the option of attending university later on (Re-
alschule, Gesamtschule, Werkrealschule), or focus on preparation for university studies (Gymnasium).
All participating students in our study belong to the first two types of schools.
9The training took place during regular school hours. The topics of the training are not covered
within the regular school curriculum.
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the end of the school year, the time between the treatment and the intertemporal choice
task was at least 4 weeks after the training and up to almost 12 weeks. We do not find
differential treatment effects on students’ allocation choices in the CTB task depending
on the length of the delay between the treatment and the experiment, suggesting that
the effects are not short-lived.
3.2 Method
The CTB task, developed by Andreoni and Sprenger (2012), asks individuals to allocate
amounts of money to two points in time. The payment received at the sooner point in
time, t, is xt, while the amount received at a later point in time, t + k, is xt+k. The
delay between payments is k. The amounts xt and xt+k satisfy the budget constraint
(1+ r)xt +xt+k = m, where 1+ r is the gross interest rate. The CTB method allows for
inner choices, i.e., individuals can allocate payments to both payment dates, in addition
to corner solutions where the entire payment is allocated to a single payment date.
We elicit choices using three different combinations of t and t+k; the tasks for each
of these combinations are presented on a separate decision sheet. The first sheet offers
payments immediately after the task finishes (t = 0, “today”) and three weeks later, so
the delay is k = 3 weeks. The second sheet offers payments today and six weeks later,
so the delay is k = 6 weeks. The last sheet offers payments in three and in six weeks,
such that the delay between payments is k = 3 weeks but there is also a “front-end
delay” as t > 0. On each decision sheet, seven budget constraints are presented to
students, where the budget m is 6 Euro. The budget we offer corresponds to about
70% of the average weekly income available to the students. Going from top to bottom
of each decision sheet, the price for the sooner payment increases. An overview of the
design appears in Table 1.10
10For example, for a delay of three weeks, the effective yearly interest rate, assuming quarterly
compounding, ranges from 0% for gross rate 1.00, to 752.9% for gross rate 1.18, and goes up to
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Table 1: Elicitation of time preferences – Design
Decision sheet Sooner payment (t) Later payment Delay (k)
(1) Today In 3 weeks 3 weeks
(2) Today In 6 weeks 6 weeks
(3) In 3 weeks In 6 weeks 3 weeks
Note: Within each decision sheet seven decisions were elicited with the following
gross interest rates (1 + r): 1.00, 1.025, 1.05, 1.08, 1.18, 1.33 and 2.00, on the
budget constraint (1 + r)xt + xt+k = m.
We adapt the elicitation task, which was originally designed for college students, to
students aged 13 to 15. Specifically, Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) offered a choice set
with 100 choices within each budget and, in a follow-up study, Andreoni, Kuhn and
Sprenger (2015) limited the choice set to seven choices. Since they find qualitatively
similar results, we simplify the presentation, reducing complexity further, to offer four
combinations of sooner and later payments. In each choice situation, participants can
either allocate 100%, 66.6%, 33.3% or 0% of the budget to the sooner point in time. To
make the variation in the time horizons salient, color-coding is used for each point in
time. Additionally, students see a calendar at the top of each sheet on which the relevant
payment dates were marked in the corresponding color. An example of a decision sheet
is provided in Figure 1. We randomize the ordering of the three decision sheets across
classes to balance any potential order effects.
3.3 Conceptual Framework
The classic model of savings and consumption (e.g., Modigliani and Brumberg, 1954) as-
sumes that fully rational consumers make optimal savings choices, smoothing marginal
utility of consumption over their lifetime, given their time preferences.
While time preferences are assumed to be fixed in the classic model, Becker and
27128% for gross rate 2.00. We chose to allow for high interest rates to capture variation in choice.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 1 2
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
22 23 24 25 26 27 28 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
29 30 27 28 29 30 31 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
AND amount in 3 WEEKS €0.00 
€6.00 
€0.00 
Amount TODAY … €3.00 €2.00 €1.00 
€0.00 €2.00 
€0.00 
€6.00 
€0.00 
€6.00 
€0.00 
€6.00 
€0.00 
€2.00 €4.00 
€4.00 
€6.00 
€0.00 
€6.00 
Amount TODAY … €3.00 €1.50 
Amount TODAY … €5.10 €3.40 €1.70 
AND amount in 3 WEEKS €0.00 
€2.00 €4.00 
Amount TODAY … €5.70 €3.80 
€0.00 €2.00 €4.00 
€1.90 
€6.00 
Amount TODAY … €5.55 €3.70 €1.85 
€2.00 €4.00 
AND amount in 3 WEEKS
€0.00 
€0.00 €2.00 €4.00 
A1.
A2.
€3.90 Amount TODAY …
TODAY and 3 WEEKS from today
AND amount in 3 WEEKS
€4.00 €2.00 
€2.00 €0.00 
Choose in each decision (A1 to A7) the amounts that you want to receive with certainty today and in 3 weeks, 
by crossing the corresponding box. Do not forget to cross only one box for each decision!
€5.85 
A3.
A4.
A5.
A6.
€4.50 
AND amount in 3 WEEKS
AND amount in 3 WEEKS
€1.95 
AND amount in 3 WEEKS €0.00 
A7.
April May June
€6.00 Amount TODAY …
€4.00 
Figure 1: Example of a decision sheet (translated from German)
Mulligan (1997) propose that time preferences may change with education. Specifi-
cally, they argue that education may decrease the costs of imagining the future and, in
turn, decrease impatience. Based on this work, a first hypothesis is that financial edu-
cation could change students’ intertemporal choices, by changing their time preferences.
Specifically, the discussion of savings and the potential uses of money saved for the fu-
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ture, extensive in the Planning and Savings module of the financial education program,
could increase a student’s preference for waiting to earn the interest from saving. A
direct test of this hypothesis can be conducted by eliciting incentivized intertemporal
choices, using the CTB task with monetary rewards. We chose monetary rewards since
they are closest to real-world financial choices, which were the object of interest in the
program.
However, the identification of time preferences using monetary rewards faces three
important challenges. First, it relies on the assumption that individuals display a per-
fect understanding of the trade-offs involved when making decisions among time-dated
payments, and choose the allocation that maximizes their utility given their preferences.
Second, it assumes that individuals are extremely liquidity constrained, and hence do
not have the option to arbitrage rewards within the task with other resources outside
the task. Third, if individuals have such options to arbitrage, identification of time
preferences is possible only under the assumption that individuals bracket narrowly,
and thus do not consider these options when making choices within the CTB task.
If such assumptions are satisfied, we would expect students to display present bias
and impatience and to smooth payments across time, i.e. choose interior allocations
that provide positive payments on the two time periods involved. Fitting a β− δ model
(e.g., Laibson, 1997) to such choices would imply a present-bias parameter β < 1, a
discount factor δ ≤ 1 and utility curvature of α < 1. We will show in Sections 4
and 5 that the choices of students in the control group, who did not receive financial
education, are largely consistent with such patterns, suggesting that the task was able
to identify the time preferences of this group.11
If treated students display significant changes in their intertemporal allocations, this
11Several studies have found that experimental choices in time preference elicitation tasks that use
monetary rewards correlate with field behaviors related to impatience and present-bias (Chabris et al.,
2008; Meier and Sprenger, 2010 and 2012; Castillo et al., 2011; Sutter et al., 2013).
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could be due to two reasons. First, the financial education program may have changed
students’ time preferences, as suggested by Becker and Mulligan (1997). Second, the
program may have affected the validity of the assumptions required for the identification
of such preferences. In what follows, we discuss these assumptions in detail.
3.3.1 Choice Consistency
A standard assumption in models of intertemporal choice is that individuals display
a perfect understanding of the trade-offs in the CTB task. Hence, they never make
mistakes. Several studies have shown that individuals often exhibit violations of ra-
tionality, even in simple choice environments (see, e.g., Gine´ et al., 2016). One such
kind of violation is the violation of the law of demand, which requires that individuals
exhibit weakly more patience as the interest rate increases.12
Financial education programs aim to raise awareness about the implications of con-
sumption and savings choices in the short- and long-run. In the program we examine,
adolescents i) discuss impulsive shopping within the Shopping module, ii) plan savings
for the purchase of a durable, such as a motorcycle, in the Planning module, and iii)
learn about the properties of different savings vehicles in the Savings module. These
discussions can improve their understanding of intertemporal trade-offs. Thus, finan-
cial education may decrease violations of the law of demand. If so, controlling for such
violations will be necessary to assess the impact of the program on patience, present
bias and the share of interior choices, i.e. choices that smooth payments over time.
12Precisely, within each of the three decision sheets, students made seven choices. A choice is
consistent with the law of demand if the allocation to the sooner payment date decreases or stays
unchanged as the interest rate increases. By definition, the first choice in each sheet is excluded. Thus,
the fraction of choices consistent with the law of demand is the sum of consistent choices divided by
18.
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3.3.2 Arbitrage and Bracketing
Students’ choices only reflect their time preferences if they are extremely liquidity con-
strained or if they bracket their choices so narrowly in the CTB task that available bor-
rowing and savings vehicles are ignored (e.g., Frederick, Loewenstein and O’Donoghue,
2002; Harrison, Lau and Williams, 2002, Cubitt and Read, 2007; Chabris, Laibson and
Schuldt, 2008; Sprenger, 2015).
Students in our sample, both in the control and treatment groups, do not appear
to be extremely liquidity constrained. They receive money from their parents (about
35 Euro each month), and often have savings (about 50% have savings, and those who
save have 71 Euro in savings, on average). Their financial situation, as measured by
their income, consumption and savings in the month preceding the experiment, does
not change with the program, suggesting that background consumption was the same
for both groups. Given the age of the students (13 to 15), they lack access to financial
markets. However, both treatment and control students could potentially borrow from
friends and family. Despite this possibility, students in the control group display present
bias and choose interior allocations of the budget, consistent with significant smoothing.
This suggests that the assumption of narrow bracketing is valid for students in the
control group.
Financial education could change the validity of the assumption of narrow bracketing
for treated students. Specifically, the degree of narrow bracketing could decrease for
treated students, since the program increases students’ budgeting and financial planning
skills. For example, the Planning module of the program raises awareness about where
students’ money comes from, how it is spent and how it can be saved to achieve students’
goals. By discussing their sources of income and savings, financially educated students
may become more “financially sophisticated”, i.e., more aware of alternative saving and
borrowing opportunities.
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If financial education decreases narrow bracketing, we would expect treated students
to be more likely to consider the possibility of arbitraging against their alternative sav-
ing and borrowing sources. This would imply that their choices are more reflective
of such sources, rather than of their time preferences. While control students exhibit
present bias, treated students would be more likely to consider alternative sources for
immediate consumption and hence would exhibit less present bias. At the same time,
since money in the task is compared to outside sources they would exhibit less con-
sumption smoothing within the CTB task. Since they cannot borrow from financial
markets, we would not expect their choices to reflect market interest rates. However,
their choices could exhibit more patience if the transaction costs involved in borrowing
from friends and family were sufficiently low.
To sum up, if students bracket narrowly throughout, and the effect of the financial
education treatment is to make students more patient, we would expect students to
exhibit less present bias and more patience in their intertemporal choices, while equally
choosing interior allocations of the budget. By contrast, if treated students are less
likely to bracket narrowly, due to the financial education program, we would expect
such students to exhibit less present bias but also fewer interior choices. The effect of
the treatment on patience would depend on the transaction costs of borrowing from
informal sources, i.e., from family and friends, which are ex-ante unknown.
To examine the effects of financial education, and the interpretation of such ef-
fects, our analysis proceeds as follows. We first investigate whether financial education
changes intertemporal choice. Specifically, we test the effects of financial education on
time inconsistency and impatience within the CTB task. We then examine whether
changes in intertemporal choices are consistent with an increase in understanding and
sophistication, or a change in deep time preferences.
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3.4 Procedures
3.4.1 Implementation of Payments
We follow a number of procedures to ensure trust and address issues of risk and trans-
action costs that typically arise when implementing delayed payments. All procedures
are explained in the instructions before any decisions are taken by the students.
Transaction costs. Students are given a “participation” fee of 2 Euro to thank them for
their participation. They are informed that the participation fee will be split equally
across both payment dates. Hence, independent of the specific choice of each student,
she will always receive at least one Euro at each point in time.
Record of payments. After students make their 21 (7×3) choices, one decision is drawn
for payment to be actually implemented. The random draw is performed by one vol-
unteer student for the entire class and this draw is noted on the classroom board.
Subsequently, based on the student’s choice and the decision drawn for payment, each
student receives a payment card that records her exact payments and payment dates.
Hence, students do not need to remember when the future payment would occur and
how much they would receive. The payment card also serves as a written confirmation
of each student’s payment entitlement. The card format is designed to fit into students’
wallets, and students are requested to keep it there. At the same time, each student
writes her name on a payment list containing the payments chosen for the decision
drawn for payment. This list is given to the teacher in the presence of the class. Both
act as records for delayed payments and the payment list ensures that payments can be
made even if individual payment cards are lost.
Delivery of payments. Payments are made in cash to each student individually in
class. Payments are made at the end of the session if today is the sooner payment
date. Delayed payments are made exactly three or six weeks later in class at the
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dates noted on the payment cards. The exact appointment for the future payment
is discussed with the teacher and then announced in class. Our instructions clearly
indicate that we will return to the class once (or twice, depending on the draw) to
make the delayed payments at the date(s) indicated on the calendars on the decision
sheets and on payment cards. The teachers are present in class when we make this
commitment.13 The same procedures are followed in the control and treatment groups,
so trust concerns should be the same across the groups. In line with this, we do not
observe a treatment effect on the average allocation to the sooner payment date, as
reported below.
Consent. Only students whose parents consent to participate are included in the
study. The parental consent forms include the researchers’ contact information, which
the teacher also obtains. Our study is conducted independently from the educational
program, and students, parents and teachers are advised to contact the researchers in
case of any doubts with respect to future payments. These procedures are followed in
both the treatment and control groups, so as to maximize trust in both. Almost all
students (97%) provide a signed consent form to participate in the study.
3.4.2 Other Experimental Procedures
In each session, the instructions for the CTB task are first read aloud in front of the
class.14 The CTB task is conducted using pen and paper, and after the task is com-
pleted, students fill out a survey. All class visits are conducted by the same two experi-
menters. Students complete four basic control questions about the task before starting
to provide their choices. Each student’s answers are checked by the experimenters
before she starts making her 21 choices.
13Teachers are, however, kept uninformed about student choices, except for the one choice that was
drawn for payment and recorded on the payment list.
14A copy of the instructions can be found in Online Appendix A.
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The presentation of the instructions takes 25 minutes, on average. Students make
their decisions in 5 to 10 minutes. After they finish the CTB task, students com-
plete a questionnaire on their gender, age, math grade, and three questions regarding
their background. We elicit their household composition (i.e., who they live with), the
language they speak at home, and the number of books at home. These are standard
questions in the PISA survey (Frey et al., 2009) that are used to capture important fam-
ily inputs into a student’s education (Hanuschek and Woessmann, 2011). Our survey
also includes four of Raven’s progressive matrices (Raven, 1989), selected to measure
heterogeneity in cognitive skills, based on a previous study in Germany by Heller et al.
(1998). The survey also includes several questions on financial knowledge and financial
behavior. The impact of the training on standard financial literacy questions is simi-
lar to the findings in Lu¨hrmann, Serra-Garcia and Winter (2015) who study the effect
of the program using survey questions in a non-experimental design. We show that
financial knowledge increases among treated students in Online Appendix B. We also
surveyed students regarding their allowance, spending, and saving behavior. In total,
the sessions last between 45 and 60 minutes.15
3.5 Sample
Our sample consists of 914 students (492 in control, and 422 in treatment) from 55
classes in 25 schools (12 treatment, 13 control).16 The average age is 14.3 years and
15As mentioned above, in each city, all sessions were scheduled to take place during the same week,
for both treatment and control groups. This was possible for 46 out of 55 classes. For a small group of
nine classes the class was scheduled to be at a practical training out of school for the week, and hence
we conducted the experiment 3 weeks later in eight classes and 6 weeks later for one class. We control
for any potential time effects by adding a month dummy for April (as 46 out of 55 were scheduled in
April) in our regression analysis.
16While coding the answers, we found that 80 students provided multiple answers or left unanswered
one or more questions. Results remain qualitatively the same if these students are included. These
students are equally distributed across treatment and control (χ2-test, p-value=0.43) and present no
difference in observable characteristics, including gender, school grade, family situation, math grade
and cognitive ability (t-tests, p-value>0.1 in all cases).
17
39.8% of the students are female. Regarding the student’s family situation, we find
that a substantial share, 46.4%, speak a language other than German at home. Also
24% live with a single parent and 60.2% report having fewer than 25 books at home.
Individual characteristics are balanced across treatment and control, as shown by the
t-tests presented in Table 2, supporting that randomization worked.17,18
Table 2: Individual characteristics in the treatment and control groups
Treatment vs. Control
Control Treatment t-test (p-value)
Girl 42.0% 37.2% 0.12
Grade 8 50.6% 52.1% 0.92
Cognition score 0.756 0.718 0.67
Math grade (relative) 0.012 0.010 0.91
Migrant background 47.1% 45.7% 0.87
Single parent 23.4% 25.1% 0.67
< 25 books at home 60.4% 60.1% 0.95
Note: This table presents the mean of the individual characteristics by treatment and control. The third
column reports the p-value of a t-test that the coefficient of the treatment dummy is equal to zero in a
linear regression on each individual characteristic, using robust standard errors. Girl takes value 1 for
female students, and grade 8 takes value 1 for students in that grade 8, 0 if in grade 7. Cognition score
is the number of correct answers in 4 of Raven’s progressive matrices. Math grade is defined relative to
the average math grade in the class. A positive value indicates that the student performs better than
the class average. Migrant background and single parent are dummy variables that take value 1 when
the student speaks a language other than German at home and lives with a single parent, respectively.
< 25 books at home is a dummy that takes value one if the subject indicated the number of books at
home was either 0-10 or 11-25 (below median), and zero if she indicated 26-100, 101-200, or more than
200 books at home (above median).
4 Results: Intertemporal Choices
We first examine the impact of the financial education program on measures of impa-
tience and present bias within the CTB task. We do not observe a significant impact of
17Overall, nonresponse is very low, less than 2.4% of the sample. The difference in nonresponse
across treatment and control is not significant for any variables, except for books at home (t-test,
p-value=0.04). Our results are robust to the inclusion of a dummy for nonresponse to this question.
18Throughout, we cluster standard errors at the individual level, as each individual made multiple
choices in the experiment. Results remain the same if we cluster standard errors at the level of the
treatment randomization, i.e. the school level.
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the educational program on the average allocation to the sooner payment, a measure of
impatience. The average share allocated to the sooner payment date is 55.04 percent
in the control group and 54.70 in the treatment group (Mann-Whitney test, p=0.4795).
Table 3 shows the results of a regression explaining the budget share allocated to the
sooner payment date. We use an interval regression model to account for the fact that
students had four choices.19 The coefficient of the treatment dummy is not significantly
different from zero.20
The treatment group displays less present bias in its allocations than the control
group. The extent of present bias within the task is measured by comparing alloca-
tion choices when the sooner payment is immediate, versus when it lies in the future.
Controlling for interest rates and interaction effects, students in the control group in-
crease their allocation by 7.73 percentage points when the sooner payment is immediate
(p=0.008), as shown in Table 3. The effect of immediacy is reduced by 7.06 percentage
points in the treatment group (p=0.095). A similar result is obtained by comparing
the proportion of present-biased choices, as shown in Table 4. Choices are defined as
present-biased if students allocate a larger share of the budget to the sooner payment
date when this date is immediate than when it is delayed. In the control group, on
average, individuals make present-biased choices in 22.2% of the cases. In the treat-
ment group, this percentage is 19.9% (Mann-Whitney test, p=0.029). The frequency of
time consistent choices, i.e., choices that are the same when the sooner payment date
is immediate and when it is delayed three weeks, increases from 58.2% to 61.5%. In
addition, there is a small decrease, from 19.7% to 18.6%, in the percentage of choices
in which the students allocate less money when payments are immediate. In all, the
19Results are robust to using an OLS or ordered probit regression model, as shown in Online
Appendix B.
20The estimated coefficient for the treatment dummy corresponds to the treatment effect for the
baseline decision sheet, which elicited allocations between 3 and 6 weeks. For this baseline decision
sheet we obtain a positive and non-significant coefficient, which can be explained by the change in the
distribution of choices in the treatment group, as detailed below.
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Table 3: Determinants of allocation to sooner payment
Allocation to sooner payment
Coefficient Std. Error
Treatment 5.444 [4.407]
Immediate Payment 7.726*** [2.932]
Immediate Payment × Treatment -7.057* [4.225]
Delay is 6 w. -4.844 [3.031]
Delay is 6 w. × Treatment 8.472* [4.358]
Gross Interest -24.671*** [2.284]
Gross Interest × Treatment -3.147 [3.187]
Female -2.981 [2.014]
Grade 8 -3.315 [2.232]
Cognition score -3.637*** [1.215]
Math grade -3.720*** [1.022]
Migrant background -0.873 [2.140]
Single parent 0.083 [2.395]
<25 books at home 4.641** [2.132]
Constant 78.034*** [5.784]
Observations 17,724
Nr of left-censored observations 4579
Nr. of right-censored observations 3547
Nr. of interval observations 9598
Pseudo-loglikelihood -23721
Note: Interval regression results. The dependent variable is the budget share allocated to
the sooner payment date, ranging from 0 to 100. Immediate payment is a dummy variable
that takes the value 1 if the sooner payment occurred immediately after the students
completed the task and survey. Delay is 6 weeks is a dummy variable that takes the
value 1 if the delay between the sooner and later payment was 6 weeks and not 3 weeks.
Individual characteristics are defined as in Table 2. Month and location fixed effects are
included. Interaction terms of the gross interest rate with delay as well as immediacy, and
their interaction with treatment, are included in the regression. Robust standard errors
are shown, clustered at the individual level. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and
10 percent level, respectively.
distribution of present-biased, time-consistent and future-biased choices is significantly
different between treatment and control (χ2-test, p-value=0.02).
The CTB task also allows the examination of sensitivity to delay, i.e. how much more
impatient individuals are when the delay between the sooner and the earlier payment
increases. In the control group, we do not find evidence of increased impatience as the
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Table 4: Time consistency and delay sensitivity in students’ intertemporal choices
Proportion of choices
Control Treatment
Time consistency
Present-biased 22.2% 19.9%
Time-consistent 58.2% 61.5%
Future-biased 19.7% 18.6%
χ2-test, p-value 0.020
Delay sensitivity
Positive discounting 19.2% 19.6%
No discounting 61.0% 62.7%
Negative discounting 19.9% 17.7%
χ2-test, p-value 0.096
Note: Time consistent choices are choices that are the same when the sooner payment
date is immediate and when it is delayed three weeks. Present biased choices are choices
that allocate a larger share of the budget to the sooner payment date when this date is
immediate than when it is delayed, while future biased choices are those that allocate a
smaller share to the sooner payment date when it is immediate. No discounting refers to
choices that are the same when the delay is three or six weeks. Positive discounting choices
are choices that allocate a larger share of the budget to the sooner payment date when the
delay increases, while negative discounting choices are those that allocate a smaller share.
delay between the sooner and later payment date increases from 3 to 6 weeks. In fact,
there is a decrease, of 4.84 percentage points, in the allocation to the sooner payment
date when the delay is six weeks instead of three.21 This is somewhat surprising, as
standard models of intertemporal choice assume that individuals either do not discount
the future or they discount the future positively, i.e. their discount factor is weakly
smaller than one. Delay sensitivity increases significantly, by 8.47 percentage points
(p=0.052), in the treatment group, as shown in Table 3.
In Table 4 we classify decisions into three types of discounting, which allows us to
assess whether it reflects a change in preferences (increased impatience) or enhanced
21Positive discounting is tested by comparing two different pairs of decision sheets. First, fixing the
sooner payment date at today, we compare the allocation to the sooner payment date when the later
date is in six weeks to when it is in three weeks. Second, fixing the later payment date at six weeks,
we compare the allocation to the sooner payment date when the sooner payment date is today to that
when it is in three weeks. Positive discounting requires a weakly positive increase in the allocation for
the sooner payment date when delay is longer.
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understanding of the task. Choices are classified as consistent with positive discounting
if the individual allocates a larger share of the budget to the sooner payment date when
the delay is six weeks, rather than three. No discounting refers to equal allocations
for both delays. A choice is classified as consistent with negative discounting if the
student allocates a smaller share to the sooner payment date as delay increases. Treated
students are somewhat less likely to exhibit such choices, and more likely to exhibit no
discounting (χ2-test, p-value=0.096). Thus, the increase in delay sensitivity among
treated students does not appear to be driven by a potential change in preferences, but
rather increased understanding. We further analyze understanding in the next section,
by examining violations of the law of demand.
The chosen allocations vary similarly with student characteristics as found in pre-
vious studies of adolescents’ intertemporal choices. For example, we find that students
with better math grades and cognition scores display more patience in their choices, in
line with Castillo et al. (2011) and Sutter et al. (2013).
To sum up, we obtain two main results. First, the financial education program
decreases time inconsistency in intertemporal choice. Second, it does not significantly
affect the average allocation to the sooner date, a measure of patience within the CTB
task. As discussed earlier, changes in intertemporal choices only reflect a change in
deep preferences if individuals exhibit a complete understanding of the task and bracket
narrowly, treating experimental payments as consumption. We turn to these two as-
sumptions in the next section.22
22An alternative explanation for changes in intertemporal choices is that financial education changes
adolescents’ financial situation (see, e.g., Carvalho, Meier and Wang, 2016; Dean and Sautmann, 2014;
Janssens, Kramer and Swart, 2017). The survey administered after the CTB task measured the
monthly allowance of each student and the amount of spending in a typical month, as well as the
amount of savings in the last month. We find no significant effects of the treatment on these measures
(t-test from a regression with a treatment dummy and robust standard errors, p > 0.1 for all three
variables, as shown in Online Appendix B). Thus, we do not find differences in students’ financial
resources between the treatment and control groups that could give rise to the decrease in present
bias.
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5 Understanding the Treatment Effects
5.1 Consistency of Choices and Present Bias
The educational program leads to an increase in consistency with the law of demand,
as shown in Table 5, column (1). A choice is defined as consistent with the law of
demand if share of the budget allocated to the sooner payment date weakly decreases
as the interest rate increases.23 The increase by 8 percentage points is significant at the
5% level. On average, pooling across all decisions, 80.8% of choices in the control and
82.9% in the treatment group are consistent with the law of demand. These rates are
very similar to those found by Gine´ et al. (2016) in individual interviews with farmers
in Malawi (81%) and by Carvalho, Meier and Wang (2016) in the American Life Panel,
an internet sample representative of the US adult population (between 82% and 84%).24
The increase in consistency with the law of demand among treated students raises
the question of whether it can explain the decrease in time inconsistency observed in
choices. To answer this question, we proceed in two steps. First, we drop choices that are
inconsistent with the law of demand from the data and re-estimate the treatment effects
on intertemporal allocations. As shown in Table 5, column (2), we obtain qualitatively
the same results. This indicates that the decrease in present bias is not driven by
inconsistent choices.25
Second, the descriptive analysis suggests that, if narrow bracketing is assumed and
individual preference parameters are structurally estimated, the control group exhibits
23Precisely, within each of the three decision sheets, students made seven choices. A choice is
consistent with the law of demand if the allocation to the sooner payment date decreases or stays
unchanged as the interest rate increases. By definition, the first choice in each sheet is excluded. Thus,
the fraction of choices consistent with the law of demand is the sum of consistent choices divided by
18.
24In line with the idea that inconsistencies may reflect indifference between allocations, we observe
higher rates of consistency with the law of demand as the offered interest rate increases.
25If we drop choices that are consistent with a negative discount rate, we obtain qualitatively similar
results.
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Table 5: Consistency with the law of demand
(1) (2)
Dependent variable: Consistent choice Allocation to sooner payment
Sample: All choices Consistent choices
Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
Treatment 0.081** [0.036] 7.309 [4.946]
Immediate Payment 0.042 [0.031] 10.115*** [3.492]
Immediate Payment × Treatment -0.068 [0.047] -9.918** [4.910]
Delay is 6 w. -0.017 [0.031] -5.679* [3.261]
Delay is 6 w. × Treatment 0.041 [0.047] 9.779** [4.711]
Gross Interest 0.062*** [0.018] -28.267*** [2.542]
Gross Interest × Treatment -0.044 [0.028] -3.994 [3.587]
Female -0.050*** [0.010] -4.419* [2.334]
Grade 8 0.009 [0.012] -3.096 [2.592]
Cognition score 0.008 [0.006] -4.035*** [1.352]
Math grade 0.017*** [0.005] -3.738*** [1.195]
Migrant background -0.008 [0.011] -1.244 [2.467]
Single parent -0.000 [0.012] -0.331 [2.757]
<25 books at home -0.022** [0.011] 4.293* [2.453]
Constant 78.996*** [6.599]
Observations 15,192 14,967
Note: Probit regression results for consistency with the law of demand are shown column (1), marginal effects shown.
Consistent choice takes value 1 if the choice is consistent with the law of demand, 0 otherwise. Interval regression
results are shown in column (2), where the dependent variable is the budget share allocated to the sooner payment
date, ranging from 0 to 100. The sample is restricted to those choices that are consistent with the law of demand.
It also includes choices at a gross interest rate of 1, which is the lowest interest rate presented to subjects, and
thus for which consistency with the law of demand cannot be tested. Individual characteristics are defined as in
Table 2. Month and location fixed effects included. Interaction terms of the gross interest rate with delay as well as
immediacy, and their interaction with treatment, are included in all regressions. Robust standard errors are shown,
clustered at the individual level. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.
time inconsistent preferences while the treatment group does not. We examine in a
structural model whether this prediction holds when we allow for errors in decision-
making. If allowing for errors eliminated the change in time consistency between treat-
ment and control, this would suggest that the change in time consistency within the
CTB task is the result of errors in decision-making. Specifically, we follow Andreoni and
Sprenger (2012) in assuming that individuals exhibit CRRA utility within the quasi-
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hyperbolic discounting model (Laibson, 1997). In this model, individuals discount the
future with a daily discount factor, δ, and a present-bias coefficient, β, that measures
the degree of time inconsistency. The curvature of the period utility is determined by
the parameter α.26
We then extend this framework to flexibly allow for errors in decision-making. We
estimate multiple error models to reduce concerns about specification error, i.e. that
our results are driven by specific assumptions about the nature of stochastic choice. In
the first model we allow students to make Fechner errors, i.e., a stochastic evaluation
of the distance between the optimal ratio of consumption and the available one. A
larger Fechner error parameter, τ , implies that this distance is given less weight and
hence that errors are more likely (von Gaudecker, van Soest, and Wengstrom, 2011).27
In the second model we follow the approach of Andersen et al. (2008), among others,
and estimate a probability choice model based on Luce (1959). In this model, there
is a stochastic decision error σ. As σ → 0 choices collapse to the deterministic choice
model, while as σ increases choices become random.
Table 6 displays the estimated parameters for each model, separately for the control
and treatment groups. We first present the results for a model without errors in decision
making in columns (1)-(2). We then present the results including specific models of
stochastic choice in columns (3)-(6). We start by discussing the parameter estimates
for the control group and then turn to the treatment group in what follows.
In the control group, the estimated β is between 0.943 and 0.975. Throughout it is
26We impose no restrictions on β throughout our analysis. See Online Appendix C for a formal
statement of the model.
27We also considered models that include a trembling-hand error in addition to Fechner or Luce
errors. In these models, there is a probability ω that an individual makes a random choice among the
four available allocations of sooner and later payments (Harless and Camerer, 1994). However, since
such errors arise at the individual level, they would be difficult to interpret when the model is used
to estimate aggregate parameters. Our preferred specification thus excludes trembling-hand errors.
This being said, results remain qualitatively unchanged when we include them, as shown in Online
Appendix C.
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Table 6: Estimated Aggregate Time Preference Parameters, by Control and Treatment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Model: Interval-censored tobit Interval-censored tobit Luce model
with Fechner errors
Group: Control Treatment Control Treatment Control Treatment
βˆ 0.975 1.003 0.967 1.005 0.943 0.989
[0.013] [0.016] [0.017] [0.021] [0.018] [0.022]
δˆ 1.002 1.001 1.003 1.001 0.991 0.990
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
αˆ 0.765 0.778 0.802 0.818 0.821 0.876
[0.021] [0.022] [0.013] [0.012] [0.026] [0.027]
τˆ 2.499 2.754
[0.112] [0.140]
µˆ 0.050 0.059
[0.004] [0.006]
Observations 10,332 8,862 10,332 8,862 10,332 8,862
H0 : βˆ = 1 0.0554 0.8447 0.0537 0.8129 0.0021 0.6081
Note: Columns (1) and (2) report the estimated preference parameters from the interval-censored tobit
model. Columns (3) and (4) add Fechner errors to this model. Columns (5) and (6) report the estimated
preference parameters from the probability choice model, based on Luce (1959) and used in Andersen et
al. (2008). All parameters are computed as nonlinear combinations, using the Delta method, of parameters
estimated using maximum likelihood. Robust standard errors are presented, clustered at the individual
level.
significantly smaller than one (χ2-test, p=0.055 or smaller), consistent with significant
present bias in students’ intertemporal choices. In contrast to recent studies, we hence
find present bias in the monetary domain, with slightly larger estimates than those
for effort choices in Augenblick, Niederle and Sprenger (2015). The estimated daily
discount factor among control students is between 0.991 and 1.003. In two out of three
specifications, students do not display significant discounting. This result reinforces our
finding in the descriptive analysis that a large share (61%) of choices is consistent with
no discounting (Table 4). The estimated CRRA parameter α lies between 0.765 and
0.821 in the control group.28 The value of α is significantly smaller than 1 throughout,
28The CRRA parameter α and the Fechner error τ are only jointly identified in the interval-censored
tobit model with Fechner errors, and hence should be interpreted carefully.
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indicating that students exhibit a very high elasticity of substitution relative to previous
studies (e.g., Andreoni and Sprenger, 2012). These estimates imply that a $20 split in
two periods would be preferred to about $46.5 in one period by control students (with
α = 0.821). This is consistent with the high rate of interior choices in the raw data
(e.g., over 48% of choices in the control group), which is higher than that found in
other studies (e.g., 88% of choices are corner choices in Andreoni, Kuhn and Sprenger
(2015)).
In the treatment group, the parameter estimate βˆ is between 0.989 and 1.005 and
not significantly different from one (χ2-test, p>0.1 throughout). Hence, we do not find
evidence of present bias in the choices of students in treatment group. Relative to the
control group, the estimated value of β increases in the treatment group (t-test, p=0.058
in the Luce model), in line with the results obtained in Table 3. This result is consistent
with the interpretation that students in the control group may have perceived monetary
payments more as consumption (closer to effort) than treated students.
In comparison to the control group, there is a small decrease in the discount factor
among treated students. It is in line with the increased delay sensitivity found at the
descriptive level, since the discount factor is identified by changes in delay sensitivity.
Finally, we find that the CRRA parameter α increases with program participation,
though not significantly. This result is also consistent with a change in students’ brack-
eting in the task. If control students bracket more narrowly than treated students,
they should exhibit a higher elasticity of substitution. The magnitude of this change
is however small, consistent with the significant but moderate decrease in the share of
interior choices (8 percentage points) in the treatment group, as we discuss in the next
subsection.
In summary, we find that the educational program increases the consistency of
choices in the CTB task. Together with the finding that the program significantly
increases consistency with zero or positive discounting, this suggests that the program
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increased understanding of intertemporal tradeoffs. However, when we account for
choice inconsistency, our results do not explain the decrease in time consistency found
among treated students.
5.2 Narrow Bracketing and Present Bias
As described earlier, a decrease in narrow bracketing would have two implications for
choices within the CTB task. A first implication of a decrease in narrow bracketing
would be a decrease in time inconsistency, as the one we have documented in Section
4.
A second implication of a decrease in narrow bracketing is that it should reduce the
degree of smoothing exhibited within the task. We refer to allocations of the entire
budget to a single payment date as corner choices and examine their prevalence. In An-
dreoni and Sprenger (2012), around 70% of the choices were corner choices, suggesting
that a majority of individuals may not have treated time-dated monetary payments as
consumption. Corner choices are less frequent in our sample, and occur more frequently
in the treatment group than in the control group (48% vs. 44%, respectively). Con-
trolling for the characteristics of the budget available and individual characteristics, we
find that the rate at which treated students choose corner solutions increases by close
to 8 percentage points, as shown in Table 7. The fact that the rate of corner choices
observed in the treatment group is almost 20% higher than in the control group suggests
a decrease in narrow bracketing among treated students.
A further implication of a decrease in narrow bracketing is that treated students
should exhibit the following pattern of choices more frequently: at low interest rates,
they allocate 100% of the budget to the sooner payment date. As the interest rate
in the CTB task increases, they switch to allocating 100% of the budget to the later
payment date, when receiving sooner payments through the CTB becomes more costly.
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Table 7: Corner choices
Corner choices
Coefficient Std. Error
Treatment 0.078* [0.043]
Immediate Payment 0.051* [0.029]
Immediate Payment × Treatment -0.025 [0.042]
Delay is 6 w. -0.032 [0.031]
Delay is 6 w. × Treatment 0.030 [0.043]
Gross Interest 0.015 [0.019]
Gross Interest × Treatment -0.026 [0.027]
Female -0.175*** [0.024]
Grade 8 0.017 [0.029]
Cognition score 0.011 [0.015]
Math grade 0.005 [0.013]
Migrant background -0.007 [0.026]
Single parent 0.041 [0.029]
<25 books at home -0.031 [0.026]
Observations 17,724
Note: Probit regression, marginal effects shown, with robust standard errors
clustered at the individual level. Corner choice takes value 1 if the choice was
to allocate 0 or 100% of the budget to the sooner payment date. Individual
characteristics are defined as in Table 2. Month and location fixed effects
included. Interaction terms of the gross interest rate with delay as well as
immediacy, and their interaction with treatment, are included in the regression.
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.
We find a significant increase of 6 percentage points in the share of students displaying
this choice pattern (p=0.035), as shown in Online Appendix B.
Furthermore, if treated students are less likely to bracket narrowly, their choices in
the task would be less informative about their deep intertemporal preferences. This
would imply a weaker correlation between estimated preference parameters and in-
tertemporal behaviors in the field, such as self-reported savings or impulsivity, among
treated students. As shown in Online Appendix C, we find that the correlation between
estimated time preference parameters and field savings behaviors weakly decreases with
the treatment, which is consistent with the conclusion that the financial education pro-
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gram decreased narrow bracketing. For example, we find that in the control group,
the estimated present bias parameter (βˆi) and discount factor (δˆi) are correlated with
the savings amount of savers. This result is consistent with the time preference elicita-
tion task being informative about deep intertemporal preferences among control group
students. By contrast, in the treatment group, the correlation between the present
bias parameter and savings decreases significantly (p = 0.06). It also decreases for the
discount factor, though not significantly (p = 0.17). This provides suggestive evidence
that the task is less able to identify time preference parameters among treated students.
6 Discussion and Conclusion
This paper examines the effect of a financial education program on intertemporal choice
in adolescence. Intertemporal choice is a central determinant of many important eco-
nomic decisions, ranging from education to savings and investment behavior. Financial
education may change such behaviors by increasing an individual’s preference for the
future or by improving her understanding of intertemporal trade-offs and sophistication
in financial decision-making.
We document four main effects of financial education on intertemporal choice. Pri-
marily, financial education increases time consistency in experimental choices among
teenagers. At the same time, financial education decreases the extent of smoothing
among experimental time-dated payments. It also increases consistency of choice with
the law of demand and, finally, it leads to an increase in consistency with zero or positive
discounting.
Taken together, these four effects suggest that financial education increases ado-
lescents’ understanding of, and sophistication in, intertemporal choice. One may ask
whether there is an alternative explanation for the four effects we document. One that
is common to experiments with delayed monetary payments is trust. Individuals who
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trust the experimenter more are typically more patient within the experimental task.
We take careful precautions in the experimental design to establish trust in equal mea-
sure in both groups. Additionally, we do not observe differences in patience in our data,
suggesting that the treatment effects are not due to trust.
Our findings provide new perspectives on the impact of financial education. From a
methodological viewpoint, they indicate that financial education may compromise the
identification of time preference parameters using standard experimental methods. We
thus contribute to the recent debate on how to measure time preferences (e.g., Sprenger,
2015; Cohen et al., 2016) by pinpointing a factor, financial education, that might be
a crucial determinant of whether the restrictive assumptions needed to identify time
preferences using tasks with time-dated monetary rewards are satisfied.
At the same time, our results suggest that short financial education programs may
change how youth make intertemporal choices, enhancing their understanding and
broadening the set of alternatives they consider when making such choices. Individuals
who receive financial education may be more likely to behave in line with the assump-
tions of standard economic models, such as rationality and broad bracketing. These
changes could have implications for wealth accumulation in the long run, in light of the
well-established relationship between quality of decision making and wealth accumula-
tion.
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